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RECAP: MASTERS GROUP INT’L, INC. V. COMERICA BANK;
CONDITION PRECEDENT FOR CONTRACT FORMATION
OR WAIVER?
Paige Griffith
No. DA 14-0113
Montana Supreme Court
Oral Argument: Friday, September 26, 2014, from 8:15a.m. to
10:15a.m., at the Huntley Convention Center in Big Sky, Montana, in
conjunction with the annual meeting of the State Bar of Montana. The
matter was taken under advisement at 10:29 a.m.
I. JAMES H. GOETZ FOR PETITIONER
Mr. Goetz started, and spent the majority of Comerica’s time, arguing
that there was no enforceable contract because the forbearance
agreement was conditional upon all guarantors’ signatures, and one
guarantor, Dr. Michael Vlahos, did not sign the agreement.
1
Further, Mr. Goetz argued that Comerica never waived this condition
because the agreement specifically stated that a waiver must be reduced
to writing. Questions from the Justices seemed to indicate that the Court
believed Comerica’s implementation on part of the forbearance
agreement was enough to constitute waiver of the condition. Mr. Goetz
argued otherwise, highlighting that under the statute of frauds principle
there is absolutely no waiver absent express agreement.
Justice McKinnon then asked, “If you assume that the forbearance
agreement was not binding, then what are you left with?” Mr. Goetz
answered the question using Michigan choice of law. He agreed with
Justice McKinnon that without the contract claims the only claims left
would be the tort claims of constructive fraud, deceit, and interference
with economic advantage. However, under Michigan law, these tort
claims are unavailable. Justice Baker then chimed in. She did her
homework and brought up two Michigan cases: one that barred tort
claims, and another that did not. Hence, Michigan law was unsettled on
this area and to Justice Baker, and potentially the entire Court, it is very
possible that there would have been no substantially different outcome if
the case was under Michigan law. Moreover, under Michigan law, the
statute of limitations (SOL) for the tort claims was 6 years, versus
Montana’s two years. Mr. Goetz argued that Masters certainly knew by
1

Oral Argument Audiofile, Masters Group Int’l, Inc. v. Comerica, (link to audio
file) (Mont. September 26, 2014) (No. DA 14-0113).
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the time of the financial sweep on December 31, 2008, that it was
injured. Thus, this operative discovery event started the time clock for
the SOL and under Montana law this tort claim was time barred.
Interestingly, not only was Mr. Goetz bouncing between Montana and
Michigan law, but Justice McKinnon also asked if his SOL argument
was even brought up at trial. Based on the Justices’ questions, the Court
seemed skeptical on Comerica’s preservation of the SOL argument.
II. WARD TALEFF FOR RESPONDENT
Mr. Taleff began stating the three faulty theories of Comerica: (1)
Comerica believes it was inappropriate to try the case in Montana, but
never challenged this venue issue at the district level; (2) the vast
majority of Comerica’s arguments on appeal were never adequately
raised in district court, were untimely, or were on a different basis; and
(3) Comerica was trying to turn the burden of proof on its head and make
Masters re-prove all the issues of fact that the 12 person jury
unanimously found in favor of Masters. Mr. Taleff argued that Comerica
was deceptively changing the undisputed facts. In the words of Senator
Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Mr. Taleff quoted, “Everyone is entitled to his
own opinion, but not his own facts.” Since the purpose of trial is for the
jury to establish the facts of the case, Masters urged the Court to defer to
the trial court’s determination of the facts.
Mr. Taleff also turned to the issue of choice of law, stressing that it is
Comerica’s burden to show that Michigan law would have has a
substantially different outcome, which Comerica never proved. Justice
Baker took issue with Masters’ use of the four-prong-most-significantrelationship test to determine choice of law. Unfortunately, Mr. Taleff
was unable to answer the question thoroughly. He explained that various
Montana contracts were unable to be negotiated and this created an
economic loss, but he went off topic on a jurisdictional/change of venue
tangent. Nonetheless, Mr. Taleff made valid arguments on the nonissue
with choice of law–Michigan law and Montana law are essentially the
same with the exception of deceit. Even more to his favor, Mr. Taleff
pointed out that Michigan law allows punitive damages without a cap.
Mr. Taleff eloquently summed up his argument by quoting Justice Rice,
“If it looks like a duck, walks like a duck, and quacks like a duck, it is a
duck, even if it holds a paper saying ‘I’m a chicken.’” Thus, the
forbearance agreement should be held as a viable contract under the law.
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III. PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Mr. Mattioli, for the State of Montana, argued that punitive damages are
not meant to vindicate any personal right of a plaintiff. Instead, punitives
serve broader societal interests in punishing wrongdoers and deterring
future misconduct. Mr. Mattioli also argued that the Court must affirm its
prior decisions and continue to uphold the punitive cap. He specifically
referred to Meech v. Hillhaven West, Inc., where the Court upheld the
statute’s constitutionality by declaring it rationally related to a legitimate
state interest. However, Lawrence Anderson, arguing for the Montana
Trial Lawyers Association, asked the Court to revisit Meech, and
interpret the punitive cap as jury nullification in violation of the Seventh
Amendment. Mr. Anderson stressed to the Court the importance of a trial
by jury and advocated that the post-verdict review of punitive damages—
without the need for an arbitrary legislative cap—sufficiently met due
process standards.
IV. PREDICTION
The majority of the court seemed receptive to Masters’ argument that
Comerica waived issues addressed on appeal that were not brought up at
trial. So, if the Court defers to the facts of the case decided at trial court,
thus not allowing Comerica to raise new issues on appeal, and agrees that
no substantially different outcome would have occurred under Michigan
law, the decision will tip in favor of Masters.
While the punitive damages issue was a hot topic pre-oral argument,
Masters and Comerica both passed the issue to the Amicus presenters.
But the Court did not seem particularly interested in their arguments. In
fact, only 14 minutes of the oral argument was spent on the punitive
damages issue, while the remainder of the 90 minutes was spent on the
contract and choice of law issues. Chief Justice McGrath’s question on
major, highly profitable corporations and the minimal punishment a $10
million punitive cap will have on these corporations, seems to point this
constitutional punitive issue at another up-and-coming appellate case to
the Montana Supreme Court, Olson v. Hyundai Motor Co, involving a
jury award of $240 million.2 It is very possible the Court may wait until
this case comes up on its docket before making any definite holding on
the constitutionality of the punitive damages statute.

2

Olsen v. Hyundai Motor Co., No. DV 11-304, 2014 WL___, (Mont.
Dist. Sept. 19, 2014).
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Lower Court: Montana Second Judicial District Court, Silver Bow
County, Cause No. DV-2011-372; Honorable Kurt Krueger.

Attorney for Petitioner, Comerica: James H. Goetz, Goetz, Baldwin &
Geddes, P.C., Bozeman, MT.
Attorney for Respondent, Masters Group Int’l, Inc.: Ward E. “Mick”
Taleff, Taleff Law Office, P.C., Great Falls, MT.
Attorney for Amicus, the State of Montana: Mark Mattioli, Chief
Deputy Attorney General.
Attorney for Amicus, Montana Trial Lawyers Association: Lawrence
A. Anderson, Attorney at Law, P.C., Great Falls, MT.

